Portable Gettysburg - Draft Version Part 2

The July 1 battle at Gettysburg proving as one-sided as it was, the action was to be taken up the 'next' day, July 2.  

In playing out the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, I had to choose between beginning at daybreak, or waiting for Lt-Genl Longstreet to complete his peregrinations bringing his two available Divisions into line. Historically, it was not until 4:00pm that he was sufficiently satisfied to throw forward the Divisions of Hood and McLaws against Dan Sickles's III Corps. Meanwhile, George Pickett's Division was still somewhere back along the Chambersburg Pike.

For his part, apprehensive of the rising ground before him where he stood in the morning, Maj-Genl Sickles had pushed forward his troops as far as the Emmitsburg Road. There they took up positions in a peach orchard and an adjoining wheat field. Behind them, Trostle Woods and the Devil's Den offered refuge in the event of III Corps being pushed back.

Four o'clock arriving, the troops in place, Longstreet lurched forward, Hood on the right making for the Devil's Den and the Round Tops. To his left, McLaws aimed for the Wheatfield.  Birney's Division would have its hands full. Humphries's Division occupying the Peach Orchard and a length of the Emmitsburg road north of it was the target of Anderson's Division. The I Corps Artillery and half of III Corps' guns supported these attacks.

I didn't bother, by the way, with the 'oblique order' of Longstreet's method of attack, with brigades in pairs lurching forward at 15-minute intervals. For one thing, such intervals fell beneath the grain of the time scale I was using. Even at 1 turn per hour, the time scale was generous relative to the ground scale.

Meanwhile, A.P. Hill's remaining two Divisions: Heth and Pender struck towards Seminary Ridge and the Emmitsburg Road, and the Cemetery eminences beyond. Only half the III Corps artillery supported this attack.

At this point my first 'Note to Self'.  When I do this again, Seminary Ridge will be moved a hex-row westward.  It is far too close to Gettysburg and the Cemetery Ridge.  The Seminary itself will probably remain where it stands, prolonging the ridge's SW-NE alignment.

Although intended to 'go in' at the same time as the attacks from the west, R.S. Ewell's II Corps began rather poorly placed. Johnson's Division stood on the Hanover road, prepared to strike at Slocum's XII Corps lining Rock Creek south of Culp's Hill. But Early, close by the Hanover Road river bridge, and Rodes, in the northern outskirts of Gettysburg itself, were going to require some time to get into battle.

Another 'Note to Self' - bring all three Divisions, and the guns, closer by one hex to the Union lines - Rodes inside Gettysburg.  Probably Early should be standing at the road junction west of the river bridges; and Latimer's artillery on the rising ground (Benner's Hill) over which runs the Hanover Road.  Thos Brown's artillery should stand between the road junction and the town. We will soon see the effect of the piecemeal nature of Ewell's attacks later on.

I might also consider placing Powers Hill beyond Williams's southern flank.  It's not there because I don't have enough hill. 

The late start by Early and Rodes left Johnson's Division alone taking on Slocum's entire XII Corps. Once in action, Latimer's guns redressed some of the balance, but, in effect, it was 5 Strength Points (SP) against 6++. The loss of a quarter of his strength to gunfire before getting fairly to grips did not augur well for Johnson's prospects.

Whilst Slocum was fully engaged with Johnson, on Culp's Hill, Wadsworth's Division had the undivided attention of Early, supported by Brown's artillery. Nor could Doubleday, alongside on Cemetery Hill, lend a hand: Rodes's Division would soon be surging out of the town and up the slopes.

In the centre, Pender's Division was soon surging up Seminary Ridge, with Heth, perhaps a half-mile to their right where the ridge descended to the level of the plain, striking at Robinson. The battle was becoming general all along the front.

Standing in reserve close by the Baltimore Pike creek bridge stood Sykes's V Corps. He soon decided to bring his whole command on behind the Round Tops to form a reserve line behind the embattled III Corps.  Far to the south, the heads of Sedgwick's VI Corps column could just be made out, approaching up the Baltimore Pike.

McLaws and Anderson were very soon in close action. The former scored such heavy early successes that Birney had to draw his Division's reserves out of Devil's Den to maintain a front alongside Humphries. Anderson was finding Humphries devilish hard to shift. Now, here I gave the Union the benefit of cover, which might have been a mistake. The Wheat Field I considered open, but Devil's Den and the wooded Round Tops I intended also to offer benefits to the defender.  I'm inclined to thing that is much too generous to the Union, especially at my chosen ground, time and unit scales.

The fighting in the north was not going the way of the Confederates. Johnson's heavy losses induced Williams to strike across Rock creek on his own account. Nor was Early enjoying overmuch success to begin with.  The fighting on Culp's Hill was settling into a battle of attrition. Rodes was still some distance from the action.

A.P. Hill's attacks were also proving costly - to both sides. In carrying the Seminary Ridge, Pender was reduced to half strength. Heth was in no better state, though there remained little under Robinson's command apart from the Division HQ. All the same, it seemed that the Army of Northern Virginia was making progress on this front.

Mixed fortunes prevailed on Longstreet's front. More accurately things were going his way, pretty much; it was R.H. Anderson who was stalled in front of the Peach Orchard, and taking a beating. Humphries simply would not be shifted.

Humphries was divided between two hexes: 2SP within the orchard, 1+ and the Corps artillery to their right in front of Cemetery ridge, where stood Hancock's II Corps. At least Pegram's (III Corps)  and the Washington Artillery (I Corps) were discouraging any counter-attack from Humphries's right wing.

The sun was close to the horizon as Early finally swept Wadsworth from Culp's Hill, and Rodes began his assault upon Cemetery Ridge. Johnson had been driven well back from Rock Creek, but that left Geary's Division exposed to Early's follow-up attacks towards the Spangler's Spring. Pender and Heth were stalled along Seminary Ridge as Howard's Corps - such as who survived the previous day's debacle - held them off from further advances.

Reduced to shadows of themselves, Pender and Heth desisted from further attacks. Anderson's command practically destroyed (0SP remaining), McLaws swung left to drive Humphries at last from the Peach Orchard. Hood took over the assaults on Devil's Den, the remnants of Birney's Division fled to and over Little Round Top, with the Confederates in close pursuit.

At this point I unexpectedly had to bring this action to a halt and pack it all away.  But I was debating whether or not to play out one more turn anyhow. The four turns that had passed represented four hours' fighting.  It was now 8:00pm, and probably getting dark. I called it at this point.

For all its time limitations and the bits that could have been improved, this turned out to be quite an exciting action. Losses were very heavy - on both sides. Whereas the previous day, the Confederates won a crushing victory, this day losses were close to even, possibly favouring the Confederacy by only the slenderest of margins.

Nothing remained of Anderson's (III Corps) and Johnson's (II Corps) Divisions.  Heth and Pender (III Corps) were both reduced to 1SP each, and Early's Division's strength had been halved. Only Hood and McLaws (I Corps) and Rodes (II Corps) were close to full strength still.

For the Union, little remained of I, XI and III Corps; and Geary's Division of XII Corps had also been destroyed. But plenty of strength remained. Hancock's Corps had hardly been engaged at all, and then only at the end of the day; Sykes and Sedgwick hadn't even fired a shot.

One of the reasons for the heavy losses was that I allowed for few retreats. As units (formations) wore down, it seemed reasonable to allow a remnant to retreat - if it could. Units reduced to 0SP stayed on the table, represented solely by their commander or flag. Note, by the way, that I gave the Union formation flags only to Corps level, whilst CSA Divisions got them. The fact of the tiny size of many Union Divisions simply made giving them a flag most inconvenient. Giving them Division commanders seemed to me sufficient, and probably unnecessary.

When returning the days' losses halved overnight, they were for convenience allocated by CSA Division or USA Corps. They were, however totalled by Army and then halved. I counted two or three 'pluses', by the way, as 1SP.  So an army that lost, say 10SP and 5 'pluses' would get back 5+2=7SP. Unfortunately, the valuable piece of scrap pa document upon which I scribed the losses has been lost to history. I think I threw it out. Definition of trash: what you throw away forty-eight hours before you discover a use for it.

The set-up for 'Pickett's Charge' might have been promising. Johnson and Anderson could have been brought back to 2SP each, Early to 3SP and Heth and Pender also to 2+ or 3SP. The Union Army would have recovered a similar number of Strength points.

So far the experiment was a qualified success insofar as I have a pretty good idea what to do next time.