Friday, January 5, 2024

One day in Outremer: 'Lanchester' Battles Extended

'Year of Our Lord, 1185. You are Reynald of Châtillon, Lord of the Catle Kerak in Oultrejourdain. You hear of a large caravan with a 100-strong Saracen escort travelling northwards from Egypt, and now passing a short distance to the east. Though a truce in in existence, the treasure no doubt carried by the caravan is too tempting. You decide to attack it.' 

Such was the opening paragraph of an article I wrote thirty years ago for the local war games club magazine, Southern Sortie. I think I was the editor at the time, and the issue was one of the last. We won't go into the demise of Southern Sortie. I had first encountered Lanchester's Theory of Battles as a high school calculus problem.  It concerned two forces, one of 10,000 men, the other of 5000. For every one man any of the 10,000 might kill, a man of the 5000 would kill two. If the armies fought to a finish, would either of the armies still be in being, and how many would be the survivors? 

In a response to a comment in a red 'Mad Padre' posting, I mentioned using calculus for something to do with war gaming. The Padre expressed interest in seeing it. For a wonder the thing was still extant among the old SS issues I still have. The article doesn't actually show the calculus bits; just the results. At any rate, here it is.

'...Your followers are few, and the castle must retain an adequate garrison. On the other hand, nearly 90 years of crusading experience has shown that, in the sort of confused melee you anticipate, your knights and sergeants-at-arms are, man for man, twice as combat effective as the lighter armed Saracens. You wish to send the fewest that will ensure a better than even chance of victory. How many men do you send? Would 50 do the job? Perhaps we should send 60, just to make certain?

'This piece is unashamedly inspired by Graham Jones's articles on resolving melees in Wargames Illustrated No41 and 41 (Feb, Mar 1991). In the first of these, he discussed the theory, published in 1916 by one F.V. Lanchester, which postulated that the outcome of melees involving two disparate forces was determined by the squares of their respective numerical strength. Now, I had run across the idea before, once as a calculus problem when I was at school (where does a quarter century [now 55 years plus] go?), and again years later in a discussion of Nelson's planning for Trafalgar. It seems that Lanchester's interest was in deciding the outcome of air battles in World War One. Graham Jones mentioned limitations of the theory in other kinds of battle [we ware talking random free-for-all melees, here], and it was this that set me thinking.' 

Not the Crusades, but a free-for-all over the ramparts
of a British redoubt at Yorktown.


'Lanchester's Theory

'In symbolic terms, let us consider two forces: RED and BLUE. In a melee, each individual will get stuck in; anyone still standing will continue to fight until eliminated or until the enemy is no more.

'Let RED comprise R individuals, and BLUE comprise B individuals.

'Now, let us suppose that, for one or another reason, if in some time interval each BLUE man/unit expect to eliminate 1 RED, then in that same time interval, each RED man/unit would expect to eliminate a number of Blues that we shall call p. This p, which we might describe as RED's relative effectiveness, might relate to greater or lesser Proficiency, Protection, more or less Powerful weapons, or some other Pfactor. It will be a number greater than zero, but need not be a whole number (e.g. If a Red could eliminate 5 opponents in the time a Blue could eliminate 4, then we could say that BLUE's relative effectiveness is 1 and RED's is 5/4 = 1.25. Were the numbers reversed, RED's efffectiveness would be 0.8.

Now, RED will win if       pR² > B²  or, if you like R > B√ (p)/p

BLUE will win if       
           pR² < B²  or, if you like B > B(p) 

and both sides will be wiped out if 
   
 pR² = B² 

'Example:    
   
'Let us consider Reynald's situation. There are one hundred enemy, but since each of our men is worth [in a fight] two of any enemy, we don't need so many as 100, but somewhat fewer. How many is determined by substituting numbers as follows:

R must be at least equal to 
B (p)/p = 100√(2)/2 = 100 x 0.7071 = 70.71
0.71 of a man doesn't mean a lot, so we would send at least 71 men to deal with the infidel.

'Survival:

'We might be interested in knowing how many of our gallant lads we could expect to return after having wiped out the enemy. We will call this s(RED) and it is found by:

s(RED) = √(R2   -  B2 /p)

Also not Crusades - but depictions of Japanese samurai
battles suggest a kind of randomness about them...

(If BLUE wins, then

s(BLUE) = √(B2   -  pR2)

'If we sent 71 men (REDs) then we would expect to see 

s(RED) = 
√(712   -  1002 /2) = √(5041 - 5000) = √(41) = 6 or 7 
i.e. six or seven survivors

'If we sent 70, thinking the fraction [0.71] unimportant, we would lose all our men, and the surviving enemy would equal 

s(BLUE) = 
√(1002 - 2x702) =√(10000 - 9800) = √(200) = 14.14'
Call it 14 survivors.

Assumptions: 
'Lanchester battles presuppose several things: 
1.Morale is not a consideration; battles are fought until one or both sides are annihilated. This unrealism is not, in my view, sufficient to invalidate the theory outright. Morale, if it is related to risk, might well be related in some way to the statistically expected outcome.
2. Chance variations are not addressed. When we arrive at a value for relative effectiveness, we are talking of statistical expectations, or mean. We will continue in this article to set this element aside.
3. These battles are general melees in which everyone is equally involved. All RED individuals have an equal random chance of being eliminated, and so do all BLUES, though the two need not be the same.'

Why should Lanchester's theory of battles not 
apply to this sort of battle?

Limitations.
'Concerning that last assumption, Graham Jones observed that the theory failed when confronted with a lack of randomness. In particular, he cited an instance in which, to use his numbers, 1200 formed infantry in 6 ranks fought 600 enemy in 3 ranks. Both sides have frontages of 200, and only these can kill or be killed. Hence the emphasis on melees.'


But need that be a limitation? Could Lanchester's ideas be extended to accommodate such a scenario? I rather thought they could...

To be Continued: Extending the Theory.  The Second half of my Southern Sortie article.












8 comments:

  1. Interesting stuff. If you are computing successes (or failures) having a mean rate over a specified time interval, isn’t a poisson model the correct specification?

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    1. Jonathan -
      Now that you mention it, in this kind of study I've been thinking more in the way of the Binomial Distribution. But I'm not even sure that is correct, either. One might argue that as everyone in the RED army (say) is likely to take a hit, and there is no replacement, you have a series of discrete uniform distributions, in which an individual is 'selected' without replacement. I wonder if there is statistically such a thing as 'nested distributions'? Poisson, Binomial, Discrete Uniform? At any rate, much seems to depend upon one's perception or perspective of what's going on.

      That it might be a Poisson is arguable, I guess, but such a distribution assumes (inter alia)
      (a) that the occurrence of an event (someone hitting or being hit) does not affect the probability of a second occurring (someone else being clobbered);
      (b) the average rate at which events occurring is independent of any occurrences (this WILL vary in time with the shrinkage of the contending forces);
      (c) two events can not occur in the same instant.
      In the case we are talking about, can we accept these assumptions? Maybe we can - at least provisionally.

      At any rate, even longer ago than 30 years I did some work upon the mean outcome of so many missiles (s) landing among a target comprising a number of discrete individuals (t). That might be the subject of yet another article. It formed the basis of some combat mechanics in my own Horse and Musket rule sets.

      All very interesting, but for the moment I just want to focus upon final outcomes. I will have something more to say about probabilities later, though, when a certain conclusion I had drawn (and published) from this study turned out to be quite mistaken.
      Cheers,
      Ion

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  2. Well, much of this is going straight over my head…
    Clearly there is likely some sort of mathematical formula here - but I suspect the likes of Hannibal, Julius Caesar and Alexander would have simply “known” the answer. The “gut feeling”.
    Cheers,
    Geoff

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    1. Geoff -
      A few years ago on this blog, I came up with a sort of 'formula' for determining time scales from the ground scales we were using. I took the time scale as the square root of the ground. So a ground scale of, say, 1000:1 (1 cm represented 10 metres) indicate a ground scale of a 1 scale minute representing about half an hour.

      It turned out that the end result was very close to the typical ground and time scales war gamers were using. Their instincts were right, but they found themselves unable to account for duration of a large scale battle of twenty turns, each representing one minute, was in effect 20 minutes. The scales in fact suggested (to me) that they had just played through a ten-hour battle - a much more realistic time scale.

      The 'gut feeling' of professional soldiers would have been due to experience, that ever-reliable educator of intuition. Napoleon had it by the bucket load.
      'How long will it take you to bring your men to the top of the Pratzen Heights?' he asks Marshal Soult
      'Twenty minutes, sire, not more,' says the Marshal.
      'Very good,' says Napoleon, 'we'll wait another quarter hour.'

      Cheers,
      Ion

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  3. Interesting - I am just reading Military Blunders by Saul David, which of course is looking at things on the scale of disaster rather than ordinary.

    One of the things I have noted is that when one decides that a disaster has happened and starts to examine it in detail, there are quite a lot of other smaller things that have gone wrong or opportunities lost along the way that can be identified and can be thought of as contributors - before the big! Disaster. …. But without the disaster at the end, those things along the way are just single mishaps without an accumulated effect.

    I am not sure how decision making and the variables associated with it can easily be formulated.

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    1. Norm -
      For a study like this, I think we are looking at an overall picture - what we might expect to be the overall outcome, other factors not supervening.

      Here's a thing. Suppose we have an army of 60,000 troops, and our enemy has 100,000. The enemy is marching in two columns, each of 50,000. We can't afford to let one column march altogether unmolested, but equally silly would be to divide our army into equal halves of 30,000 to oppose each enemy column.

      So what do we do to give ourselves a fighting chance? We do something along the following lines.
      1. Take up a central position between the enemy columns;
      2. Divide our army into a 5000-man column with orders to delay one of the enemy columns and jolly it along; and...
      3. Set off with 55,000 to beat up the other.

      Of course, any opportunities to shorten the odds against the small column and lengthen the odds in favour of the larger ought not to be overlooked!

      I have an idea that there is an optimum split in our example scenario. But recall the tiny armies Napoleon tasked with facing the Allied columns in 1815. General Rapp, with V Army Corps of maybe 23,000 men had to face more than ten times his strength, whilst Napoleon sought a decisive confrontation in Belgium.

      Whilst there, the campaign opened with Napoleon seizing the central position, and dividing his army asymmetrically with the idea of holding one wing whilst delivering the decisive blow with the other.

      It all went wrong when Blucher/Gneisenau stole a march on Grouchy, and created, together with the Anglo-Dutch army, precisely the central position and asymmetrical split Napoleon favoured!

      All this ignores, of course, the proverbial 'want of a nail' that can lead to disaster.
      Cheers,
      Ion

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  4. BTW, googling "Lanchester model of combat analysis" provides a lot of (academic) papers and further analysis. But I guess you;re aware of that as well :-)

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    1. Phil -
      Actually, I wasn't particularly. I did discover recently, though, that there was some Russian who came up with a similar notion.

      What motivated my to write this article was a throwaway comment in someone else's blog. Someone who saw no use in calculus. The thing went from there.

      I recall several years ago discussing Lanchester in one of those war games groups - one devoted to rules design, as I recall. The thing has been defunct for years.

      Cheers,
      Ion

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